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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 187TH GLIDER INFANTRY REGIMENT
(11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION) IN THE LANDING AT
NASUGBU, LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
31 JANUARY-3 FEBRUARY 1945
(THE LUZON CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Regimental Supply Officer)

Type of operation described: REGIMENT IN A BEACHHEAD LANDING

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INTRODUCTION

In the preparation of this monograph on the operations of the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, 11th Airborne Division on its landing at Nasugbu, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 31 January 1945, several questions were thought of by the writer. Why did the 11th Airborne Division make an amphibious landing? Why was this particular area selected? Was this a proper mission for an Airborne Division? Was the unit ready for another mission after its Leyte fighting?

Also in writing on the part played by the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment in this action it is necessary to include the actions of other elements of the division. This is especially so in regard to the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment as most of the action of the two regiments were as a combined force, operating directly under the Commanding General of the Division and indirectly under the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army. The actions of one glider regiment cannot be separated from the other if a complete picture of the operation is given.

The Battle of Leyte was over, that is officially, on 26 December 1944 for on this date "organized enemy resistance was declared officially broken". (1) However, all elements of the 11th Airborne Division were not completely relieved by the 96th Infantry Division until 14 January 1945. At this time the 11th

(1) A-2, p. 2

Airborne Division was brought into its staging area on Bito Beach near Tarragona, Leyte, just north of Abuyog. (2)

(Sketch "A") The 11th Airborne Division had been engaged in some of the toughest fighting in Leyte, even to include cleaning out the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. (3)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The principal picture of the Philippine Islands Campaigns now shifted to Luzon, with the landing in the Lingayen Gulf (Map "B") on 9 January 1945 by the Sixth U.S. Army. The Sixth U.S. Army originally had the target date of 20 December 1944 for its landing in Lingayen Gulf, however, this date was later changed to 9 January 1945. This change was mainly due to the Allied Air Force being unable to support the mission because of the unexpected delay in airfield construction on Leyte, caused by the continuous rains. (4)

The Sixth U.S. Army was to land with the I Corps and XIV Corps abreast. The 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions abreast in I Corps and 40th and 37th Infantry Divisions abreast in XIV Corps. The 25th Infantry Division was to be Sixth U.S. Army reserve. The 158th RCT, 13th Armored Group and 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion were additional troops along with supporting troops of the Sixth U.S. Army Service Command. The 11th Airborne Division, reinforced, was to be prepared on or after 1 January 1945 to execute an airborne mission or to move by air or water transportation to the Lingayen Gulf area. (5) The Eighth U.S. Army was given the mission of air-mounting the

(2) A-2, p. 9; (3) A-2, p. 7; (4) A-6, p. 9; (5) A-6, p. 7; A-4, p. 39

11th Airborne Division. (6) However, GHQ Operations Instructions 73/12, dated 1 December 1944, eliminated the 11th Airborne Division from the Sixth U.S. Army troop list, primarily because the Allied Air Forces were unable to handle a divisional airborne mission at this time. (7)

The Sixth U.S. Army met little resistance on its landing, however enemy resistance stiffened as the infantry divisions drove south towards Manila. Much of this can be accredited to the fact, "the enemy expected the American forces to approach from the South". (8)

Although the Sixth U.S. Army had no organized resistance on its landing and very light resistance on the right flank the enemy did defend strongly on the left flank against the 43d Infantry Division. The greatest impediment in the first phase of the operation was the condition of the beaches in Lingayen Gulf, causing a vital shortage of supplies and equipment. Especially needed was Bailey bridging equipment to span the many streams and marshes in this area. (9)

This was another example of landing where the enemy did not expect us to assault. It was later brought out that the enemy expected a landing in the Damortis-San Fernando area, to the exclusion of the Lingayen-Dagupan area. (10)

On 29 January 1945, XI Corps, under Eighth U.S. Army control, made an assault landing on the beaches in the San Antonio-San Narcisco area on the west coast of Luzon without opposition. The Corps consisted of the 38th Infantry Division,

(6) A-6, p. 109; A-4, p. 1; (7) A-6, p. 10; (8) A-4, p. 87; A-14, p. 7; A-3, p. 24; A-10, p. 61; (9) A-6, p. 18, 19; (10) A-6, p. 21

the 34th Infantry RCT (24th Infantry Division) and other combat and service elements. Again, this was a landing in a place completely surprising to the enemy. Against only light opposition by 31 January 1945, this force had captured Subic Town and Olongapo. (11) (Map "D")

At the time of the landing of the 11th Airborne Division, 31 January 1945, at Nasugbu, the Sixth U.S. Army had advanced south to Calumpit. (12) (Map "D") The Sixth U.S. Army had overextended its main supply route and was in great danger of an enemy strong counterattack on its thinly held flanks which would sever the line of communication to Lingayen Gulf. (13) The Mike-Six operation at Nasugbu and the Mike-Seven operation in the San Antonio-San Narcisco area were the much needed diversionary attacks to confuse the enemy. (Map "B")

ENEMY FORCES

Before the Sixth U.S. Army landing on 9 January 1945, G-2 estimates of the Japanese strength on the Island of Luzon was approximately 160,000. The largest concentration of these troops, 77,000, were in the Central Luzon area. (14) (Sketch "B")

"In addition to land forces, there was the ever present threat from air and water. Recent air raids by Admiral Halsey's fleet had reduced the enemy air force to an estimated nominal figure of 160 fighters and 170 bombers." (15) The

(11) A-6, p. 30; A-1, p. 77, 81; A-3, p. 22; (12) A-4, p. 79; (13) A-4, p. 80; (14, 15) A-4, p. 3

writer did not see even one airborne Japanese plane over Luzon from the day he landed on 31 January 1945 throughout the campaign. However, hundreds of enemy planes were seen at Lipa, Nichols, Clark, and other air fields; these planes having been destroyed on the ground by our air force. It must be said that one of the major reasons for the complete success of this campaign can be attributed to the Allied air superiority.

Our intelligence patrols secured the information from guerrilla forces that the Nasugbu beach area was defended by only two 75-mm gun batteries and several machine guns, emplaced on the high ground at Nasugbu Point, Wawa, and the high ground at San Diego Point. It was believed that the enemy would defend from the high ground further inland in his elaborately prepared positions near Aga. (Map "F") This information proved to be accurate.

THE MISSION

"On 13 January 1945, the 11th Airborne Division was alerted by a warning order from Headquarters Eighth Army. The division was relieved of tactical duties in the mopping-up of Leyte and it proceeded to stage for the Mike-Six Operation. (16)

By 22 January 1945 plans for the operation were completed and Eighth Army Field Order No. 17 was published. It directed the 11th Airborne Division (less the 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team) to execute a reconnaissance in force in the

(16) A-1, p. 9

Nasugbu area by overwater movement from Leyte, with 31 January designated as X-Day. (17)

The detailed plan (Map "C") was as follows:

- (1) One regimental combat team was to seize and defend a beachhead in the objective area (Nasugbu);
- (2) A second regimental combat team was to land later at Nasugbu as directed by the Commanding General, Eighth Army;
- (3) The south flank of the landing was to be secured by blocking the approach of the enemy from the Balayan Bay-Santiago Peninsula area (Phase I);
- (4) The 11th Airborne Division was to drive inland and effect a juncture with the 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team on Tagaytay Ridge (Phase II); and
- (5) The 511th Parachute Regimental Combat Team was directed to move by air from Leyte and Mindoro bases and land by parachute on Tagaytay Ridge in order to secure the approaches to the north and to deny the enemy access to its objective area. Following the juncture with elements of the 11th Airborne Division driving eastward from Nasugbu, the advance to the north was to continue as rapidly as the situation would permit." (18)

THE DIVISION AND REGIMENTAL SITUATION

The 11th Airborne Division had about ten days for planning and briefing for this operation. Several officers of the

(17) A-1, p. 9, 10; (18) A-1, p. 10

division were sent by submarine to points off the expected landing beaches and then inland by rubber raft. These officers were met by Filipino Guerrillas and stayed several days on Luzon, returning with much valuable intelligence information of the enemy and terrain. Because of reports gathered by these officers the original plan, to land the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment at Lucena and the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment at Nasugbu and the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment to jump into the zone that received the most resistance, was changed. The plan now was to have the 11th Airborne Division (minus) land at Nasugbu with the 511th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team jump at Tagaytay Ridge. (19) (Map "C")

The division had organized a "war room" which included an excellent sand table and complete aerial photo coverage of the landing areas. In addition, through the G-2 channels, terrain handbooks, aerial photos, and maps of the area had been issued down to include battalion staffs. The only catch in this for the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment was the staffs spent most of the planning period studying the Lucena area before the change had been announced. (20)

Credit must be given here to the excellent G-2 information we had in planning this operation. Much of this credit is due to Lieutenant Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool, 034570 (then Major Vanderpool) who was the GHQ Liaison Officer and had been coordinating guerrilla activities in Batangas and Cavite Provinces of Luzon for approximately four months before our landing.

(19) A-21; (20) Personal knowledge and all following not otherwise stated is personal knowledge

Lieutenant Colonel Vanderpool was a volunteer for this job and was landed in Luzon by submarine.

As soon as elements of the division were able to get out of the mountains of Leyte they were placed in a staging area on the beaches near Tarragona. Here the men of the division were given a chance to rest, soak up some much needed sunshine, and get the very much needed medical attention they were unable to get during the fighting in the muck and mud of the jungle-hills of Leyte. One of the major causes of ineffectives in the division was the numerous cases of jungle rot (similar to trench foot). Many of the men were unable to wear shoes.

Replacements were received on 19 January at the division staging area. These replacements were originally scheduled for the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment but were diverted to the 11th Airborne Division. The replacements were 22 officers and 934 enlisted men. (21)

It was a very busy time for all supply echelons as approximately 90% of the individual equipment and clothing and many of the crew served weapons had been lost in the jungle fighting of Leyte or destroyed by the Jap parachute attack on the division supply area at Burauen on 6 December 1944 and had to be replaced. (22)

At the same time a shake up was made among commanders and staffs to replace those lost through combat or reclassification. This was especially true in the 187th Glider Infantry

(21) A-1, p. 35; (22) A-8, p. 5, 8

Regiment as we changed the regimental executive officer, regimental surgeon, both battalion commanders, and both battalion executive officers, as well as many company officers. Of course, reorganization was being made in all the units down to include the squads and up to the staff of the division as a result of our first combat.

All the vehicles had to be completely overhauled due to the continuous use in mud for almost two months. In addition all vehicles had to be water-proofed in preparation for the next operation. The weapons had to be thoroughly inspected and repaired and units had to be serviceably equipped. This led to a light training program for the line outfits, but a heavy program of work for the commanders, staffs, and the service elements of the division and smaller units.

The division was in a high state of esprit de corps. Morale was excellent. The men had experienced a good taste of combat and had emerged victorious. For the first time in weeks men were tasting hot food, and getting a chance to take care of personal matters. During the Leyte campaign the rain and mud caused the roads to be so bad that often caribou pack trains were formed to transport emergency rations and supplies to the units in the foothills. Aerial resupply became one of the major means to get supplies to the front line elements in the jungle hills. Therefore, most of the food eaten by the fighting troops was "10-in 1", C, K, or D rations, none of which can be said is satisfying for an extended period of time. (23)

(23) A-9, p. 8, 12, 13

During the Leyte Campaign the 11th Airborne Division had killed 4,286 and captured 12 Japanese. (24)

Things began to shape up throughout the division for the coming operation with the issuance on 25 January 1945 of the 11th Airborne Division Field Order No. 10. Likewise the supply loading plan was issued from the division quartermaster.

(Annex IV) This plan laid the responsibility of loading the division reserve supplies on the separate unit commanders. The Division G-4 had set up a special section for the job of planning and loading the division. This section was headed by Major John S. Conable, who did an admiral job on the operation.

The catch to the whole plan was the uncertainty of what ships the Navy would send and this was not definite until the ships came in at approximately 2000 hours on 25 January. Most of the supply ships were completely loaded within 24 hours, except for the great bulk of engineer supplies, ammunition and gasoline. The LCIs for the troops arrived at 0700 hours on 27 January and soon thereafter, the troops went aboard. The assault convoy of almost a hundred ships (LSMs, LSTs, LCIs, APDs and escort destroyers) pulled out to sea late that afternoon.

The convoy headed south through the Mindoro Seas, then swung north through the Sulu Sea to Mindoro where the 511th Parachute Infantry Combat Team disembarked to prepare for their jump on Tagaytay Ridge. The remaining force proceeded to its assigned mission to arrive on schedule at Nasugbu Bay. (Sketch "A")

(24) A-8, p. 6

Two FS boats carrying a great bulk of the division's engineer Class IV, ammunition, and gasoline did not proceed with the assault convoy. This affected the division greatly in regard to gasoline and it became necessary, during the operation, to have gasoline flown in by C-47 planes. (25)

The time from 27 January to the morning of landing on 31 January passed too quickly. Every man aboard the LCIs were crowded. As there were no cooking facilities for troops, the men ate "10-in-1" rations. There were no "steak and eggs last meal" served these troops as customary prior to a landing. The staff of the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment aboard one LCI included the commanding officer, S-1, S-2, S-4, regimental surgeon, and communications officer. Most of the sailing days were spent in map study, planning and orientation.

Excess baggage was not carried. The personnel had only that which they could carry on their backs. One-half of the kitchen equipment was left in Leyte and all T/O and E equipment that the commanders did not believe necessary for the operation. All gas masks had been inspected, boxed and were held under division control. The lesson learned in Leyte was that men would abandon excess equipment, more especially the gas mask. Personnel carried one K and two D rations and one unit of fire for the assault. We did not see our personal baggage until two months after the landing.

(25) A-1, p. 51, 52

COMPARISON OF AN AIRBORNE INFANTRY DIVISION
WITH A STANDARD INFANTRY DIVISION

At this point it is of interest to study the organization of the 11th Airborne Division in general, and in more detail the glider infantry regiments.

The division had approximately 550 officers, 25 warrant officers, and 8,200 enlisted men. The major units were a Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company, a Military Police Company, a Signal Company, a Medical Company, a Quartermaster Company, an Ordnance Company, a Division Band, a Parachute Maintenance Company, an Engineer Battalion, two Glider Infantry Regiments, a Parachute Infantry Regiment, a Division Artillery Headquarters Company, two Glider Field Artillery Battalions, a Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, and an Antiaircraft Battalion. (26)

The Glider Infantry Regiments had a Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Service Company, Medical Detachment and two Glider Battalions. The Glider Battalions were composed of a Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and three Rifle Companies, each. The Rifle Company strength was approximately 150, the Glider Battalion approximately 650, and the Glider Regiment approximately 1550 enlisted men plus 85 officers. (27)

It is interesting to compare these figures with the T/O and E 7-11, as shown in the Special Text Infantry Division, January 1948, The Infantry School. A standard Infantry Regiment is composed of 3530 enlisted men and 157 officers, an

(26) A-13, Annex A; (27) A-13, p. 1, 2

Infantry Battalion of 863 enlisted men, and an Infantry Company of 203 enlisted men. (28)

Note that the Glider Infantry Regiment was approximately half the strength of the standard Infantry Regiment. It is also interesting to note that the Glider Infantry Regiment had a total of 35 vehicles (25 $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton jeeps and 10 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks) compared to the 308 wheeled vehicles of the standard Infantry Regiment (198 $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton jeeps and 77 $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks). (29)

THE ASSAULT LANDING AT NASUGBU, LUZON, P.I.

The 11th Airborne Division, Mike-Six Task Force arrived off the coast of Nasugbu, Luzon on 31 January 1945 after an uneventful voyage. Contrary to the Sixth Army, Mike-One Task Force which landed at Lingayen Gulf and had suffered much loss from enemy air, not an enemy airplane had been sighted enroute or in the landing phase. In the Report of the Luzon Campaign, the Sixth Army says, "Despite the air cover furnished both by the Allied Air Forces and Naval carrier based aircraft, the convoys were subjected to numerous and serious enemy air attacks enroute to and after arrival in the objective area. From 3 January 1945 through 8 January 1945 three of our ships were sunk, 13 sustained major damage and 14 sustained minor damage through enemy air action. Enemy suicide planes accounted for 27 of these." (30)

This lack of enemy airplanes can better be understood if one could have seen the hundreds of smashed Japanese planes found on Nichols Field when the 11th Airborne Division secured

(28, 29) A-26, Chart 2; (30) A-6, p. 15

this area on 12 February 1945. Because of little evidence of burning, it was thought the Japanese had drained the gas tanks of these aircraft to supplement their meager supplies. (31)

The day of 31 January 1945 was very calm, and as the sun shone on the serene sea it was difficult to imagine that perhaps in a few minutes all "hell" could break loose, if the enemy was well entrenched on the landing beach. The writer was aboard a command LCI with part of the Headquarters Company, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, including the commanding officer, Colonel Harry B. Hildebrand.

At 0700 hours a welcome sight appeared (eighteen A-20's and nine P-38's, our air cover) and gave the beach a raking over. At 0715 hours the bombardment by the naval escort ships started. This bombardment lasted almost an hour with close-in shelling by rocket ships, which were converted LCI's. At 0815 hours the first troops began to land and at 0822 hours the beach party radioed they had landed without opposition, and at 0825 hours the first and second waves, composed of the 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, had landed. At 0830 hours Colonel (now Brigadier General) Robert Soule, commanding the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, had landed with his staff. (Map "E")

Following in quick succession, other waves of foot troops landed; although what had been expected to be a practically "dry" landing troops were in water from waist to chin deep.

(31) A-10, p. 7

There were no enemy obstructions on the beach and with the calm sea no beach swells to interfere with the landing boats. However, this lack of beach swells turned out to be a hindrance in getting heavy equipment ashore. The landing craft carrying the vehicles and other heavy equipment were unable to get close enough into the shore for good landings and were forced to back off and try again several times to get the best drive inland possible. Later a system of using large ships to cruise behind the landing craft creating swells helped the craft get further inland.

"Because of unsatisfactory beaching conditions, only three-eighths of the wire equipment and one-half of the radio equipment of the 511th Airborne Signal Company were unloaded." (32)

Due to the narrow beach and the confusion caused by the beaching and retrials of some of the landing craft, the artillery support for the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment had not landed at 0912 hours when the first machine gun and artillery fire of the enemy from the direction of Wawa (Map "E") landed on the beach.

This machine gun fire also began to fall on some of the landing craft. At this time, the landing crafts with vehicles were not able to get closer than within three feet of water and other similar craft were being held off shore, as one 2½-ton truck and one tank destroyer had already sunk into water above their engines. The beach party continued active through this fire and soon had landing markers erected to direct in the remainder of the landing craft.

(32) A-17, p. 5

At 0930 hours the machine gun fire was located as coming from a large building with a red roof at Wawa and in a few minutes a naval rocket ship had completely destroyed this enemy emplacement. This excellent naval cooperation and continuous air protection continued during the entire landing day. Unloading of ships with equipment proceeded slowly as several craft had drowned-out vehicles stalled in front of their ramps.

Fires began to leap high in the sky from the burning buildings in Wawa village caused by the rocket ships. At 1010 hours the secondary landing, composed of the 2d Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment (minus Company G), which was to land at H plus 2 hours was called off and the boat loads directed back to their transport rendezvous area. This secondary landing was made up of teams with special demolition equipment, flame throwers and had the mission to scale the high ground at Nasugbu Point (Map "E") and destroy the enemy positions which G-2 had spotted there through guerrilla information. Artillery support was to be by the Navy, through the Naval Liaison Team attached.

At 1015 hours more machine gun fire was received from the left flank of the beach and at the same time artillery fire began to drop on the beach. This appeared to be about 75-mm caliber type. The large landing craft were finding difficulty in getting within six to eight feet of water about fifty yards from shore. At 1020 hours the request was made and approved for the naval destroyers to cruise close to the beach in order to create swells to help beach the landing craft. This was partly successful.

At 1030 hours a friendly naval sea plane landed in the vicinity of the landing beach. This appeared to be one of the planes which had convoyed us to Nasugbu.

The 1st Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment landed at 1030 hours as the division reserve, quickly assembled and moved up into the Don Pedro Sugar Central area, east of Nasugbu (Map "F") to reorganize. This battalion was still under regimental command and was not to be committed except by division orders. In the early afternoon this battalion was ordered to move up to be attached to the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, which had pushed on at a fast rate towards Tagaytay Ridge. (33)

The 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, less Company C, soon after landing was ordered to continue their push towards Tagaytay Ridge as fast as possible. All considerations were disregarded except to keep the enemy on the run and push through his forces before he could get his various lines of defense set up. (34)

The 2d Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment when it landed was ordered to move immediately to the south, across the Lian River; attack the enemy at Lian and on San Diego Point (Map "F"), and to cover the division's right flank. After Lian had been taken and the enemy had been driven back into the hills this battalion moved out to join the other battalions on the march to Tagaytay Ridge. Company G, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, under command of Captain H. J. Merritt (then First Lieutenant) relieved this battalion. (35)

(33) A-20; (34) A-16, p. 1; (35) A-16, p. 3

At this point it is of interest to discuss some of the difficulties encountered by the artillery supporting the assault elements.

Battery D, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion landed with the leading elements in support of the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment. The battery came under fire of the machine guns and artillery from Wawa (Map "E") while landing. The guns had to be hand towed into place because the 3/4-ton trucks, used as prime movers, had stalled in unloading off the ramps of the landing craft. These guns got into action early and their counter fire from the beach on the enemy at Wawa was effective. The .50 caliber machine guns, normally used as antiaircraft protection for the howitzers, were emplaced at the Nasugbu air strip (Map "E"), to protect the division liaison airplanes from enemy attack. Half of the gun crews were used as patrols against the enemy in the hills north and east of Nasugbu. After the action on the beach the battery moved on a forced march of 20 miles in 24 hours, towing the guns most of the way by hand, assisted by 1/4-ton trucks, and supporting the infantry by fire all the way. (36)

"The Air Section, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion winched its mobile loaded liaison airplanes through 100 yards of surf, and, under hostile machine gun fire assembled one airplane by nightfall and one by the following morning." These planes were used on 2 February to drop ammunition, food, and water to the advance elements of the division in addition to their normal liaison flights. (37)

(36, 37) A-17, p. 3

The troops already landed were not clearing the beach very fast because of the limited avenues of exodus from the beachhead. (Map "E") As can be seen the beach is separated from the mainland by swamp, rice paddies, and several coastal streams, forcing all the troops to use either of the two existing roads. At 1045 hours the air cover was still strafing Nasugbu Point but the sporadic machine gun fire continued onto the beach. Another naval rocket salvo was placed on this target with effect.

At 1100 hours the first contact with Filipino Guerrilla troops were made by elements of the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment and received only negative information in regard to the Japanese forces.

At 1530 hours the leading elements of the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment had crossed and secured the Palico River bridge. This bridge had been prepared for demolition, but the Japs detailed to destroy it were completely surprised by the rapid advance of our troops. The Japs were caught out of position and our fire prevented them from reaching the bridge to set off the demolitions. Several Japs were killed and the others withdrew into the hills. The divisional engineers with the forward elements removed the demolition charges and our troops continued eastward.

Company C, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment had been sent to Wawa to destroy the enemy strong position there, which had been delivering the artillery and machine gun fire on the

beach, and to secure the air strip on the north edge of Nasugbu. At 1120 hours, again, a large salvo of rocket fire was laid down by the navy to silence the enemy on Nasugbu Point. This had to be carefully coordinated fire as Company C was already in the Wawa area. The fire was laid down within three hundred yards of our troops with extreme accuracy. At 1142 hours, some of our 75-mm artillery had been landed on the beach, registered, and were now bracketing in on Nasugbu Point. No enemy fire had been received from this point since the last naval rocket salvo.

At 1215 hours the staff of the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment had landed and by 1300 hours had established a command post on the northeast edge of Nasugbu -- then began the job of reorganization.

At approximately 1400 hours the Commanding Officer, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment sent his S-4 back to the beach to locate the 2d Battalion of this regiment, and to check up on the regimental vehicles and equipment being unloaded. The battalion was found being organized after their much disorganized landing due to change in orders in their original mission. The battalion commander was given the order to move his battalion to Wawa and the Nasugbu air strip to relieve Company C, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment, continue with vigorous patrols to destroy the enemy, and to protect the division from the north and northeast. This battalion later had the difficult mission of destroying the many by-passed Japs in the hills as the rest of the division drove on to Manila. In addition it was charged

with keeping the "one mile wide-sixty five mile deep beach-head" open by protecting the only route of supply.

The 1st Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment killed several of the enemy in the vicinity of the Don Pedro Sugar Central and then moved out on the road to Tagaytay Ridge. The battalion established its battalion supply point at the Sugar Central, where the men's rolls were dropped. Equipment was reassigned to make loads lighter as the troops had to hand carry all equipment, weapons and ammunition. This forced march lasted from the afternoon, at approximately 1500 hours, until 0400 hours on 1 February when the battalion joined with the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment.

The battalion was ordered to dig in for the remainder of the night and two hours later, at 0600 hours, jumped off on the attack. Up until this time no strong resistance had been encountered. Some resistance had been overcome by the leading elements of the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment approximately 2300 hours on the night of 31 January-1 February. The enemy had been caught completely by surprise and gave only token resistance.

At daybreak on 1 February our forces received heavy fire from all the positions of the enemy in the Mount Aiming sector. (Map "F") The enemy, figuratively speaking, were looking down our throats and showed it by their most effective artillery fire from their well dug in and camouflaged positions. Here our troops received their first real casualties of this operation. (38)

(38) A-16, p. 3

The 1st Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment was committed on the north of the road as the spearhead of our forces with the 2d Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment on the right, south of the road, and the 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment in the rear as regimental reserve. Our troops used every type of weapon we had to knock out this enemy position to include mortars, artillery, flame throwers, two attached tank destroyers, white phosphorous grenades, and close support by the 5th Air Force.

On 2 February our forces continued the attack following an effective airstrike by A-20s at 0815 hours on the enemy positions, in the vicinity of Aga, (Map "F") between Mt. Cairilao and Mt. Batulao. The assault was so vigorous and fast that the enemy were driven back in complete rout. This was verified by the capture of an enemy regimental command post at Aga at 1300 hours which showed the haste in which their personnel had departed. Large stores of ammunition, food, clothing, engineer equipment, and cigarettes were captured. Several cases of liquor, many documents, weapons, and a Japanese saber were also found by the writer. The documents and saber were turned into the division headquarters. Another indication of the hasty retreat of the Japs were the numerous individual soldier packs found containing food and clean clothing. (39)

The 2d Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment then turned south to capture Shorty Hill (this is not shown on any official map, but is the hill mass between Aga and Tagaytay

(39) A-16, p. 3

Ridge (Map "F") and was named after Colonel Robert (Shorty) Soule, CO, 188th Glider Infantry Regiment.) Over 300 Japanese were killed in taking this position of enormous supply tunnels, reinforced concrete caves, and strong emplacements. After the capture of this hill the battalion then turned to join the other battalions in the attack towards Tagaytay Ridge. (40)

The 1st Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment continued on as the leading battalion against successive Jap lines, often overrunning the defenses before the enemy could get properly organized. This was true almost throughout the entire drive to Manila, indicating the enemy lacked unity of organization.

The last position of the Japs, west of Tagaytay Ridge (Map "F") was taken against heavy resistance. The enemy positions were composed of well camouflaged pillboxes emitting every type of artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire he had.

On 3 February our forces were able to drive their way through to effect a junction with the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment on Tagaytay Ridge. (41)

This entire operation was closely supported by the 674th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm Howitzer), the 675th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm Howitzer), and the Cannon Company, 21st Infantry Regiment.

The 511th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team departed Mindoro Island (Sketch "A") at 0700 hours 3 February with P-69 night fighters and P-38 fighter cover. The first

(40) A-16, p. 3; (41) A-17, p. 5

drop was approximately 50 plane loads landing at 0815 hours. Most of the troops dropped from three to five miles short of the selected drop zone. Personnel of the division's reconnaissance platoon had already passed through the Jap lines into this area. Here they set off smoke signals to aid the drop but because of the low cloud formation were not seen by the jump masters. (42) The second drop was made about 1215 hours. The drop was completely unopposed and by 1300 hours the parachute elements joined up with the elements of the division which had landed at Nasugbu. (43)

Both Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger and Major General Joseph M. Swing were present with the forward elements and at 1330 hours made contact with Colonel Orin D. Haugen, Commanding Officer of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment, who had jumped with his troops.

It was at this time that General Eichelberger told Frank Smith, correspondent, as reported in "The Chicago Times", 10 February 1945, "the 11th Airborne Division was the 'fightingest goddam troops' he ever saw". (43a)

"This contact culminated a 3-day foot march under continuous enemy fire and covered a distance of 35 miles. The rapidity of the advance threw the enemy off balance, exposing his well prepared defenses to the attack." (44)

The 11th Airborne Division Command Post moved into the Manila Hotel Annex (Government House) located approximately on the center of Tagaytay Ridge, which is 2,500 feet above

(42) A-10, p. 2; (43) A-10, p. 3; (43a) A-30; (44) A-16, p. 1

Lake Taal. (Map "F") The night of 3-4 February was spent in reorganization of the division in preparation for the forced march the next day which carried elements of the division 35 miles to the southern outskirts of Manila. (45)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In making a study of this operation, I find little criticism of the operation as a whole. An operation is judged by its success in accomplishing its mission and without a doubt, the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment accomplished its mission as part of the 11th Airborne Division in landing, securing Nasugbu, and its ultimate drive to Manila. No better proof of this can be had than the accompanying citation by Lieutenant General R. L. Eichelberger, Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army. (Annex I)

First of all this operation was undertaken within 15 days of the time the units came out of the most savage fighting of Leyte. Replacements had not been given sufficient time to become fully oriented into their units. Many men were still suffering illness from the diseases contracted in the Leyte jungles. This is better shown by a study of the battle and nonbattle casualties during the Leyte operations and the first 10 days of the Luzon operations. (Annex III) (46)

For the period 18 November to 26 December 1944 (landing on Leyte to the official close of the campaign), the 11th Airborne Division had 478 battle casualties and 5 non-battle casualties.

(45) A-10, p. 4; (46) A-2, p. 37, 38

But in comparison for the period of rest and first 10 days of Luzon fighting, the division suffered 54 battle casualties and 319 non-battle casualties. These non-battle casualties were mostly the effects of the Leyte campaign. Great numbers of men were hospitalized the first few days on Luzon with jaundice contracted in Leyte. (47)

Credit must be given here to the Filipino women, many of whom were trained nurses, who volunteered as nurses for the division hospital established in the school building and public square at Nasugbu. Credit should be given also to the Air Transport Command and to those who set-up the air evacuation by C-47 planes from the Nasugbu air strip by X plus 2 days. I believe the air evacuation as practiced by the 11th Airborne Division whenever possible saved many lives as well as relieved the burden of hospitalization from the division.

Although many officers and men were not in physical condition their indomitable spirit was a great contribution to the success of this operation. Many officers, although advised by the surgeons to be hospitalized because of the jaundice, continued on their jobs. One of these officers was Lieutenant Colonel William R. Crawford, G-4 of the division, who continued his driving pace until he was killed a few days after the operation began.

Notwithstanding this was an initial beach landing, proper provision was not made for sufficient troops and equipment to handle all the necessary supplies to support a division

(47) A-10, p. 8

logistically. The Engineer Committee of The Infantry School teaches that a division should have an Engineer Special Brigade to support an infantry division tactically and logistically, yet not any engineer troops were attached for this purpose.

The planning and preparation for this function was made by the division with use of troops from the divisional engineer battalion and the parachute maintenance troops plus the supervisory help of the Chemical Warfare Officer and the Special Service Officer. This unorthodox set-up in itself was enough to foul up our logistical support in landing, but when the beaches turned out to be bad for the landing craft, confusion reigned. It was fortunate that someone had thought to have several Dukws aboard the landing craft, but as can be expected from an unit not experienced in amphibious landings, there were no assigned drivers. The ingenuous American soldier showed his ability again when the recruited 2½-ton truck drivers, given the assignment, handled these Dukws expertly.

Even with this makeshift organization we would have been blocked on the beach logistically, if it were not for Colonel Jose Razon, a Filipino AUS officer, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, who had formerly served on General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's staff in the Philippines and was a coordinator of guerrilla forces. Colonel Razon organized the Filipino men of Nasugbu into shore party working details to accomplish a job that otherwise would have sapped our combat units.

The 187th Glider Infantry Regiment was not fought as a regiment but throughout the operation was split up by having one of its battalions attached to the 188th Glider Infantry Regiment and the other battalion used as flank protection for the division. This made the operation a "division-battalion" affair leaving the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment Headquarters a supervisory regimental staff for beach supply operations, guerrilla activities and protection of the division supply line. Of course these were necessary tasks but not appealing to those concerned as all were imbued with the spirit of the "Fighting Angels", the nickname given to troops of the 11th Airborne Division.

Practice landings should have been made prior to this operation as it would probably have assisted the delay caused by the vehicles getting stuck in front of the landing crafts' ramps. Our troops just did not have the experience to prevent it.

This operation was primarily a planning and maneuver operation, initially. Like the other two landing operations on Luzon prior to this one, the troops of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur had again landed in an unexpected area, placing our troops in mass at the least defended locations.

The Japanese, had they used their forces available in coordinated counterattacks, could have greatly delayed our troops. The entire operation was road bound because of the swamps and rice paddies on both sides of the road in the low-lands and the mountainous jungle in the high ground.

The Japanese showed his lack of intelligence, without leadership, as a soldier. With the best defensive terrain, he continually allowed his positions to be outflanked. When this happened he would end up in panic, usually dying fanatically because of being imbued with the idea of non-surrender. There seemed to be no coordination or definite plan to tie in successive defensive lines. Each time our troops hit a new defensive position it seemed to catch the Japs completely by surprise.

The complete lack of the Japanese in the knowledge of massing his artillery was one of his greatest weaknesses. When he did use artillery it was generally one gun at a time on a specific place. It seemed he also lacked the knowledge of shifting his fire or because of the dug in positions in the mountain caves, he was unable to shift the fire, so that our troops were often able to by-pass his concentrations.

The failure of checking our supplies carefully or of failing to make an alternate plan left our division short of ammunition, gasoline and rations after two days ashore. Resupply had to be brought in by C-47 planes and because of the soft ground of the air strip in Nasugbu during wet weather the planes could not deliver every day.

Another shortage of food developed in lack of rice for our Filipino guerrillas and laborers. These people demanded to be fed or they would not work and they did not like to eat the American "10-in-1" ration. Knowing we were to operate in an area where there were thousands of guerrillas we would

necessarily have to supply and possibly use as civilian labor, plans should have been made to bring in the type of food suitable to feed these people.

Excellent use was made of the liaison airplanes both for tactical missions in observation work, and logistically support for delivery of supplies to the front line troops.

The following statement made by Lieutenant General R. L. Eichelberger well sums up the actions of the officers in this action. "Outstanding personal leadership of senior officers was a conspicuous characteristic of these operations. The constant presence of ranking officers in the zone of action stimulated the confidence of the men in their leadership and inspired them to greater effort. Another advantage of this personal reconnaissance and first hand contact was that authoritative action could be and was taken without recourse to communication channels. With the time lag thus eliminated, it was possible to take full advantage of the rapidly changing combat situation." (48) Throughout the operation both Lieutenant General Eichelberger and Major General Swing with their staffs were found well forward among the combat elements.

LESSONS

Some of the lessons emphasized by this operation are:

1. "The principle of mass means having superior combat power at the decisive point at the decisive time." (49) This was definitely shown by the landing at Nasugbu and the entire operation following.

(48) A-1, Foreword; (49) A-27, p. 1

2. "The principle of strategic surprise is as necessary as tactical surprise." (50) The landing was made with complete surprise to the enemy as evidenced by the light opposition. The Japs were just as surprised at our rapid advance as evidenced by the Palico River bridge being secured by 1530 on 31 January 1945 before the enemy could destroy it, although demolitions had been placed to destroy it. (51)

3. Security is most important for an initial landing operation. The reconnaissance party sent into this area by submarine brought back little information unknown to the command, however the security of this operation was greatly jeopardized by their contacts with the guerrillas. It was found on the day of the landing that many civilians in Nasugbu had previous knowledge of the operation. (52)

4. The principle of cooperation and unity of command was excellently demonstrated by the naval rocket fire in support of the infantry prior to the divisions artillery emplacing on shore. The closeness of air support from the first bombardment of Nasugbu beach throughout the operation was the maximum in cooperation. The Japs lacked this principle in their defense completely.

5. "Offensive action necessary to win a war." (53) The Japanese were completely on the defensive throughout this operation. The enemy had three years in which to get the best positions for cover and concealment and to establish lines of supply but these were of no avail against our aggressive offensive action.

(50) A-27, p. 1; (51) A-1, p. 14; (52) A-1, p. 41; (53) A-27, p. 2

6. "The principle of rapid movement requires from the leader -- anticipatory planning, prompt decisions, clear and concise orders, rapid transmissions of orders." (54) This principle was followed close to the letter by all commanders being well forward at all times. When the landing proved more successful than first anticipated, the Eighth Army Commander ordered the division to continue their advance as rapidly as possible by a forced march until daylight. (55)

7. The lesson of a continuous drive and the assumption of a calculated risk is well expressed by Colonel Harry B. Hildebrand. "I studied and taught tactics for 30 years and when the war came I really ~~feel~~ that for units larger than a company there were no tactics, just drive and that drive in a commander was the only qualification which mattered. Any commander who tried to take time for reconnaissance and proper preparation for an operation was benched immediately. Just a matter of getting there in the quickest possible time." (56)

8. The inherent characteristic of the American soldier to push forward to win a fight when he believes in that for which he is fighting. The good morale and esprit de corps of soldiers is as important in winning wars as any other factor. This feeling of the troops had been greatly enhanced by our success in the Leyte campaign proving the old axiom, "that nothing succeeds like success."

9. Divisional engineers can be used for shore party work when necessary, but it is better to use these troops in close support of the combat elements of the division.

(54) A-27, p. 2; (55) A-1, p. 16; (56) A-20

10. Use of friendly nationals for labor troops is a great saving of men from the combat elements. However this use must be planned in detail down to include feeding of the workers on the job to get the maximum efficiency from them.

11. Communications and control is difficult at its best in a landing operation and a fast moving situation. This difficulty can be greatly reduced by commanders of all echelons being well forward in the operations.

12. Assault landings whenever possible should be made during daylight. Enough confusion exists as it is without adding darkness to the situation.

13. Airborne troops should be used on missions for which they are especially equipped and trained. Although successful in this operation, airborne troops are greatly handicapped without armor and heavier artillery support than that normally organic.

14. Terrain is not a barrier and road blocks will not necessarily deny use of roads unless fully covered by fire. Although this was extremely rugged terrain, the Japanese depended too much on their defensive positions. The road was blown in several places which did not delay our foot troops and the engineers with bulldozers quickly made passage for the combat vehicles.

15. Air evacuation is feasible and should be used to the maximum extent.

16. Troops should be in top physical condition prior to starting an operation. The great number of non-battle

casualties, if possible, should be avoided as this decreases efficiency of an unit just as much as battle casualties.

17. Fire superiority is most important in an offensive action.

18. Supply control must be continuous. Supply is a command responsibility. If there had been continuous bad weather our necessary resupply could not have been delivered by air and it is probable the action would not have progressed so quickly. When a division is operating on a separate mission, troops from army should be attached to operate supply depots. The burden on the light airborne division's small service elements is too great.

19. American troops could move and fight at night in the Philippines. Until this operation it had been an adopted policy to start digging in for perimeter defense "where is" when darkness came.

20. Plans should be flexible and simple. Immediate action should be taken to capitalize on any mistakes of the enemy. It was very possible to have called off the airborne jump of the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment and brought these troops in through Nasugbu. It was approximately 24 hours after the jump before this unit contacted any Japanese forces as the drop zone had been cleared by the Filipino guerrillas and the reconnaissance platoon of the division. (57)

21. Air superiority in modern warfare must not be underestimated. Our air superiority was one of the outstanding elements in the victory against the Japs.

(57) A-1, p. 21

22. Organization of defense in depth must have all lines of the defense plan coordinated. Otherwise the defense is purely a succession of defensive positions. Defensive positions must not only be dug, but must be completely manned and equipped for an aggressive defense.

23. Divide and defeat in detail. That was the principle of the three major amphibious operations in Luzon against the Japs.

24. A division "war room" is an excellent idea and very feasible for any planned operation. Too much prior planning cannot be made at any echelon of command.

25. Great use can be made of guerrilla troops during operations in territory of friendly nationals, however care should be taken in estimation of the intelligence received from them in regard to enemy actions and strength.

26. Once contact has been made with the enemy and he is driven back, pursuit must be relentless. He must not be allowed time to get reorganized. The mission of combat is to destroy the enemy.

27. All these lessons and principles can be summed up in the words of Lieutenant General R. L. Eichelberger: "Although no new combat techniques were developed in these operations the combination of mass and speed, surprise and simplicity of maneuver, once more proved its worth. The initiative, once secured, was not relinquished and the tempo of the advance was not permitted to decrease until the enemy had been met in full

strength. Opposition along the route of advance was contained and overcome without interruption of the forward advance. Speed was emphasized and contact once gained was maintained until the enemy was either dispersed or annihilated." (58)

(58) A-1, Foreword

HEADQUARTERS
11th Airborne Division
APO 468

14 February 1945

SUBJECT: Unit Citation

TO : Officers and Men of the 11th Airborne Division

I communicate the contents of this citation by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, to the Officers and men of this division with deep gratitude.

We have one obstacle left to complete a long-to-be-remembered operation. Tomorrow we attack Ft McKinley. I expect the same determination which carried us thus far to overcome this obstacle by nightfall.


"UNIT CITATION"

"By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9396 (Section I, Bulletin 22, WD, 1943, and Section IV, Circular No. 333, WD 1943), the following unit is cited by the Commanding General, Eighth Army:

"The 11th Airborne Division is cited for outstanding heroism and superior performance of duty in action against the enemy on Luzon, Philippine Islands. On 31 January 1945 the 11th Airborne Division landed on the southern coast of Luzon at Nasugbu which had been organized for defense by the enemy during their three years of occupation. By determined and aggressive action, employing only infantry with light artillery support, the town of Nasugbu was seized and a spearhead pushed rapidly to the east. By speed and maneuver, through forced marches over extremely difficult terrain, the defiles on the approaches to Tagaytay Ridge were captured one day after the landing. Tagaytay Ridge and the avenues of approach to Cavite Plains were seized by the third day. On the fourth day, the town of Imus was by-passed, a bridgehead was established across the Paranaque River and the enemy were driven from their main defensive positions south of Nichols Field. The rapid progress of the division, made possible through by-passing strong points and using a minimum of troops for the reduction of obstacles, completely disrupted the enemy strategy of defense. In the period of four days, the outstanding courage, aggressiveness and determination of the men of the 11th Airborne Division in marching and fighting their way through sixty miles of enemy-held territory and maintaining an undefended line of communication completely disorganized the enemy forces, weakening them in the north and thereby hastening the fall of Manila".

J. M. SWING
Major General, USA
Commanding

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:


ISAAC HOPPENSTEIN
Major, Infantry

ANNEX I

PARTIAL ROSTER OF OFFICERS OF 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

Maj Gen	Joseph M. Swing	03801	Commanding General
Brig Gen	Albert Pierson	011838	Asst Commanding General
Col	Irvin R. Schimmelpfennig	018046	Chief of Staff
Lt Col	Glenn J. McGowan	0290985	Asst C/S G-1
Lt Col	Henry J. Muller, Jr.	024508	Asst C/S G-2
Lt Col	Douglass P. Quandt	020605	Asst C/S G-3
Lt Col	William R. Crawford	020797	Asst C/S G-4
Lt Col	Allen R. Cozier	0202208	JAG
Lt Col	Robert E. Conine	024393	AG
Lt Col	James L. Crane	0357392	FO
Lt Col	Sidney A. Heaton	0358740	IG
Lt Col	Joseph M. Pensack	0362751	CW
Lt Col	Hudson B. Phillips	018653	ChC
Lt Col	Franci W. Regnier	022699	MC

PARTIAL ROSTER OF OFFICERS OF 187TH GLIDER INFANTRY REGIMENT

Col	Harry B. Hildebrand	05016	Commanding Officer
Lt Col	George O. Pearson	0253334	Regt'l Executive Officer
Capt	Gerald W. Hansen	0355756	S-1
Capt	Cletus N. Schommer	01283851	S-2
Maj	Ernest L. Rinehart	0373441	S-3
Maj	Isaac Hoppenstein	032373	S-4
1st Lt	Henry T. Diello	01298365	Comm O
Lt Col	Arthur H. Wilson, Jr.	020693	1st Bn Commander
Lt Col	Norman E. Tipton	018408	2d Bn Commander

CASUALTIES 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

	KIA	WIA	BATTLE		MIA	DOW	TOTAL	NON-BATTLE			TOTAL
			ILIA	EM				SICK	DEATHS	OTHER CAUSES	
18 Nov- 26 Dec 44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM	EM
	111	289	19	1	3	34	446	5	0	0	5
26 Dec 44- 10 Feb 45	2	10	0	0	0	0	12	8	0	3	308
	16	10	8	0	8	0	42	235	3	70	

SECRET

OFFICE OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER
11th Airborne Division
APO #468

24 Jan. 1945

Memo To: Unit Commanders

1. No bulk cargo will be loaded on LSM's
2. Following space on LST's is assigned for cargo:

<u>Div. Designation</u>	<u>Responsible Unit</u>	<u>Other Units</u>	<u>Class Cargo</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>MT</u>
LST #9	188 P.G.I.		V	On each side running 40' x 8' x 8'	128
			I	Beginning next to starboard ammo pile running 40'x5'x9'	40
			IV	Beginning next to port ammo pile running 40' x 7' x 9'	64
			III	On starboard side 22' in front of ammo 39' x 6' x 6'	29
		675 FA)	III	On port side 22' in front of ammo 39' x 6' x 6'	33
LST #10	187 P.G.I.		V	On each side of the ship 36' x 8' x 10'	130
			I	Next to starboard ammo 36' x 4' x 10'	37
			IV	Next to port ammo 36' x 8' x 10'	64
			III	Beginning 76' from rear bulkhead on both sides 30' x 6' x 6'	39
LST #11	127 Engrs		III	Beginning 64' from rear bulkhead on port side running 29' x 6' x 6'	16
		152 AAA	III	On starboard side be- ginning 64' from rear bulkhead 29' x 6' x 6'	10
		674 FA	V	On each side 32' x 7'6" x 6'	73
		675 FA	V	Space 32' x 13' x 6' be- tween the two stacks of 674 ammo	65
		674 FA)		Loaded across the front	10
		127 Engr)		of the ammunition 7' x	10
		Hqs Btry) I		28' x 26'	2)
		D-457 FA)			7
		221 Med)			
			V	25' x 28' x 7'	10

SECRET

Div. Designation	Responsible Unit	Other Units	Class Cargo	Location	MT
LST #12	152 A A		V	25' x 28' x 7' Width of ship	10
		675 FA			88
		D-457 FA			20
	152 A A		I	Piled directly in front of Class V	10
		408 QM			2
		Hq. Co.		5' x 28' x 6'	3
		511 Sig.			3
LST #13	NO BULK CARGO				
LST #14	511 P. Inf		I)	On each side	45
		675 FA	I)	30' x 6' x 6'	7
	511 P. Inf.		IV	Between two ration piles 30' x 14' x 6'	70
	511 P. Inf.		III	On each side beginning 48' from the rear bulk- head and extending for- ward 30'. 30' x 6' x 6'	43

** Unless otherwise specified all measurements begin at the rear bulkhead. Dimensions are given in the following order: Length, Width and Height.

3. CO of Unit responsible for loading will appoint Officers as T.Q.M. and assistant T.Q.M. per LST.

4. LST T.Q.M.'s will arrange for necessary motor transportation (Thru Div. M.T.O.) and labor from its parent organization. If he picks up cargo from a Unit other than his own, he may obtain labor therefrom.

5. LST T.Q.M. will prepare in quadruplicate a stowage chart of the completed load.

6. T.Q.M. will deliver two copies of manifest to Div. T.Q.M. (Capt. CONABLE) one to Skipper of Ship, retain one.

7. LST T.Q.M.'s will inform Div. T.Q.M. frequently of status of loading his ship.

8. Each unit will send three men with a 2½ ton trk, a 1½ ton trk, and a ambulance, to remain with the LST during the voyage. Two men will accompany a jeep or 3/4 ton trk, if it is being used to pull another piece of equipment; otherwise only one man will accompany these vehicles. Personnel to accompany special engineering equipment and 102nd AAA weapons as designated by Commanders.

9. Responsible unit will see that there are sufficient voyage rations for the men on the LST's and LSM's. Unit may require the parent organizations of the men to furnish these rations, if they so desire.

10. Any voyage rations remaining aboard LCI's will be unloaded if possible.

For the Division Quartermaster:

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Isaac Hopfenstein
ISAAC HOPFENSTEIN,
Major, Infantry

s/ John S. Conable
JOHN S. CONABLE
Capt. Q. M. C.
Division T.Q.M.